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Chemical security and the Corzine bill



Dear All:

This note is in response to Joan Cortese's misrepresentations about the
Corzine bill.  In the interest of full disclosure, let me state up front that
National Environmental Trust worked hard to get this bill through the Senate
EPW, and will continue as the bill makes its way through.

Ms. Cortese is right in that Sen. Corzine's bill is not just about security.
But, as she is no doubt aware, so-called "security" improvements would do
nothing to prevent a terrorist attack from the air, or by someone who works
at one of the chemical plants.  People in the surrounding areas and workers
at the plants are still vulnerable to both terrorist attacks and the everyday
accidents that occur at facilities.  In fact, the accidents are much more
likely to happen.  The so-called risk-based approach that Ms. Cortese
describes is absolutely useless in this regard, and it is disingenuous of her
to say otherwise.

Sen. Corzine's bill would require facilities to take a look at their
operations and attempt to make them safer for everyone.  It would not mandate
use reduction, but would make facilities examine how they use chemicals and
devise ways to use them more safely and efficieintly.  It does not require
facilities to stop using chemicals integral to their production.  In case
there are no efficiency improvements to be made, the bill asks facilities to
consider other measures that increase everyone's safety from accidents and
terrorism.  Increased security is, of course, one of those measures.  But it
is not the most important one, and again, Ms. Cortese obviously must realize
this as well.

At this point, I want to point out that this is hardly the first time that
ACC companies have tried to dodge the issue of inherent safety.  NET was part
of a consortium of enviros that invited ACC companies to reduce their
worst-case-scenario vulnerability zones voluntarily back when they first
submitted their CAA 112r data to EPA.  Only three companies agreed to do
anything, and the rest gave us a bunch of platitudes about how WCS doesn't
mean anything anyway.  Well, clearly the Senate EPW thinks otherwise, and
it's about time.

Obviously, it is incumbent on the chemical industry to improve its security.
When I was a contractor for the State of New Jersey, I visited nearly 100
facilities in 1994-5 to review their pollution prevention plans.  I wandered
around quite a large number of facilities looking for the enviro manager.
Few had any visible security, although I'm sure that has changed.  

My experience with the NJ pollution prevention planning process showed that
facilities found more P2 opportunities through the planning process than they
had before planning -- significantly more.  So I don't doubt that many
cost-effective efficiency and safety improvements can be found through the
Corzine bill's requirements.  Maybe the added impetus of EPA review will make
facilities take the extra step of implementing them, something that wasn't
required in NJ.  What puzzles me is the industry's continuing to fight it.
Yesterday's Washington Post contained an article about security that states
outright that the chemical industry and others have joined forces to try and
kill the bill if it reaches the Senate floor this fall -- even though the
13-0 vote in EPW clearly indicates that the Senate, if not industry, is
interested in making communities safer.

==============================
Tom Natan, Research Director
National Environmental Trust
1200 18th St. NW, Fifth Floor
Washington, DC  20036
202/887-8828, 202/887-8889 (f)
tnatan@environet.org


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